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Rejecting Federal Preference: Why Courts Should 
Not Exempt Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Properties 
from Cities’ Vacant Property Registration Ordinances 
Matthew Connelly

 
The law of real property usually develops in an evolutionary 
fashion. Change is often measured in terms of decades and 
centuries rather than in months and years. Yet economic 
turmoil can accelerate this process.
1
  
Today, cities
2
 both large and small are faced with growing amounts 
of abandoned property resulting from the recent collapse of the 
housing market.
3
 This problem has affected communities across the 
nation, as abandoned homes have harmed their surrounding 
neighborhoods by increasing blight, decreasing tax revenue, and 
 
 
 Matthew T. Connelly, member of the 2015 graduating class at Washington University 
School of Law. Special thanks to Betsy Allen and all of the staff members on the Washington 
University Journal of Law and Policy. 
 1. GRANT S. NELSON ET AL., REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT 
468 (6th ed. 2009).  
 2. The term “city” may have different legal connotations than the terms “town,” 
“village,” etc. See, e.g., People ex rel. Hatfield v. Grover, 101 N.E. 216, 218–19 (Ill. 1913) 
(discussing different legal distinctions between these terms). For purposes of consistency, the 
term “city” in this Note shall refer to cities, towns, villages, municipalities, and any other form 
of local government. The legal distinction between these forms of local government is not 
relevant within the scope of this Note.  
 3. As an illustrative example, there is a national phenomenon known as “zombie homes,” 
in which residential properties are abandoned by the homeowners and the mortgage lenders 
refuse to finish the foreclosure proceedings, thereby leaving the properties vacant and 
unaccountable. See Michelle Conlin, Zombie Foreclosures Terrorize Ex-Homeowners, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/Latest-News-
Wires/2013/0110/Zombie-foreclosures-terrorize-ex-homeowners. As of 2014, Milwaukee had 
900 “zombie foreclosure” cases pending within its jurisdiction, and South Bend had 1,275 
homes caught in zombie foreclosure, a significant rise from 600 in 2006. Furthermore, zombie 
foreclosures in Memphis doubled from 2011 to 2013 to 1,500 homes. Id. See also Mary Ellen 
Podmolik, Unresolved Foreclosure Cases Pile Up in Cook County, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 22, 2014), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-01-22/site/ct-foreclosures-0122-biz-20140122_1_fore 
closure-crisis-foreclosure-cases-short-sale. As of January 2014, there are at least 4,000 homes 
in Chicago that have been caught in foreclosure proceedings for the past three years, many of 
which are abandoned. Id. 
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draining public resources. In order to combat the epidemic of 
abandoned houses, however, cities have begun utilizing a relatively 
new device in the realm of real estate law: vacant property 
registration ordinances.
4
  
Vacant property registration ordinances operate by requiring 
either the homeowner (mortgagor) or the mortgage lender 
(mortgagee) to register residential property once it becomes 
abandoned, which ensures that some party maintains the premises 
and is accountable for its dilapidation.
5
 Successful ordinances enable 
cities to effectively monitor and regulate these properties. This 
system is important because local governments bear significant 
expenses preserving vacant houses within their jurisdictions and 
preventing them from crippling the surrounding communities.
6
  
Recently, in Federal Housing Financing Agency v. City of 
Chicago,
7
 the Federal District Court of Northern Illinois examined 
whether Chicago could enforce its vacant property registration 
ordinance against abandoned homes if either Fannie Mae or Freddie 
Mac owned the mortgage.
8
 The court ruled against Chicago and held 
 
 4. See Benton C. Martin, Vacant Property Registration Ordinances, 39 REAL EST. L.J. 6, 
9 (2010). In 2009, there were a total of 285 enacted or pending vacant property registry 
ordinances in the nation. Id. As of December 2014, there were 2,013 enacted or pending local 
government vacant property registry ordinances across the country. See Vacant Property 
Registration, SAFEGUARD PROPS., http://www.safeguardproperties.com/Resources/Vacant_ 
Property_Registration/all.aspx?filter=vpr&city=&category (last visited Dec. 7, 2015). 
 5. Id. 
 6. See BUS. & PROF’L PEOPLE FOR THE PUB. INTEREST ET AL., HOW CAN 
MUNICIPALITIES CONFRONT THE VACANT PROPERTY CHALLENGE? 2 (2010), available at 
http://www.bpichicago.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/HowCanMunicipalitiesConfronttheVacant 
PropertyChallenge_AnIntroductoryGuide-1.pdf (according to a Harvard study, local 
governments spend anywhere between $5,000 to $34,000 to secure and maintain a single 
abandoned home). For further discussion regarding why local control over vacant property 
registration ordinances is more effective than on the state level, see Timothy A. Davis, A 
Comparative Analysis of State and Local Government Vacant Property Registration Statutes, 
44 URB. LAW. 399, 421–24 (2012). Davis argues that local governments are in stronger 
positions than states to implement vacant property registration ordinances because they can 
tailor the specific ordinances to meet the needs of their municipalities, and they are generally 
free from the mortgage industry’s lobbying influence. Id. at 421–22. Further, he examines how 
local governments are able to determine whether to implement the Classic Model or the Chula 
Vista Model based on their knowledge of what has caused the majority of vacant property 
within their jurisdictions. Id. at 422–24. Davis also discusses how cities must strongly enforce 
these ordinances to ensure that abandoned buildings adhere to the standards. Id. at 424.  
 7. 962 F. Supp. 2d 1044 (N.D. Ill. 2013). 
 8. Id. at 1047–48. 
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that those properties were outside the jurisdiction of the city’s 
ordinance.
9
 By exempting Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac properties, 
the court’s ruling impacts the effectiveness of all vacant property 
registration ordinances across the nation and may determine whether 
these ordinances remain a viable tool for local governments 
combating the damages inflicted by abandoned houses.
10
 
Part I of this Note examines how abandoned property negatively 
affects its surrounding communities. Part II shows how cities have 
enacted vacant property registration ordinances to address these 
problems. Part III examines the Federal District Court of Northern 
Illinois’s analysis and holding in Federal Housing Financing Agency 
v. City of Chicago regarding Chicago’s vacant property registration 
ordinance. Part IV refutes the court’s holding by arguing against 
implied preemption and showing that the ordinance’s registration fees 
are permissible regulatory fees, not impermissible taxes, on the 
federal government. Finally, this Note proposes that future courts 
facing similar challenges against vacant property registration 
ordinances should not exempt properties where either Fannie Mae or 
Freddie Mac owns the mortgage. Such a massive exception will 
significantly inhibit cities’ abilities to effectively address and 
maintain abandoned property. 
I. THE HAZARDS ABANDONED PROPERTY INFLICTS UPON CITIES 
In their article Neighborhood Stabilization Strategies for Vacant 
and Abandoned Properties, Frank S. Alexander and Leslie A. Powell 
state that “legal and political cultures have been strikingly unwilling 
to acknowledge, much less address, the impact of vacant, abandoned 
and substandard properties.”11 While the problem of neighborhood 
 
 9. Id. at 1048. 
 10. See Mary Ellen Podmolik, Chicago Loses Court Challenge to Vacant Building 
Registry, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 26, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-08-26/business/ 
chi-chicago-vacant-building-registry-20130825_1_fhfa-federal-housing-finance-agency-fannie-
mae (“More than 1,000 municipalities around the country, by one count, have laws that require 
the registration and maintenance of vacant properties. The court’s decision could prompt the 
FHFA to file suit against other cities’ local laws, or municipalities themselves may have to 
retool their own ordinances if they decide they are no more enforceable than Chicago’s.”). 
 11. Frank S. Alexander & Leslie A. Powell, Neighborhood Stabilization Strategies for 
Vacant and Abandoned Properties, ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 1, 3 (2011), available at 
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blocks plagued with abandoned homes was once mainly confined to 
“Rust Belt” inner-city communities, nearly every region in the 
country is now confronting this issue.
12
  
This epidemic resulted from the recent collapse of the housing 
market and has worsened in the subsequent years.
13
 Once residential 
properties are abandoned, they are at risk to damage both from 
vandals and lack of regular maintenance.
14
 Such dilapidation, 
however, is more than just an eyesore on a neighborhood block. A 
vacant home’s substantial deterioration threatens its surrounding 
community’s stability by increasing crime, lowering property values, 
and depleting local government resources.
15
 
 
http://blog.cookcountyil.gov/economicdevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Neighborhood-
Stabilization-September-2011.pdf. 
 12. See, e.g., Scott Gunnerson, When Owners Walk, ‘Zombie’ Homes Become Nuisance, 
USA TODAY (Sept. 1, 2013, 3:37 PM) http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/ 
2013/09/ 01/foreclosed-homes-zombie-titles/2753385/. For example, as of June 2013, Florida 
had more abandoned homes that were caught in a state of “zombie foreclosure” than any other 
state in the nation. Id.   
 13. See Courtney Hunter, Note, Reducing the Spillover Costs of Foreclosure: Boston's 
Block-by-Block Approach to Saving Neighborhoods from Foreclosure Blight, 29 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 533, 537–38 (2010). In January 2009, the Center for Responsible Lending 
estimated that one and a half million homes had been foreclosed upon as a result of the housing 
crisis that began in 2007, and another two million homes were in danger of foreclosure. Id. 
Furthermore, they predicted that thirteen million foreclosures were predicted to take place over 
the next five years. Id. Ten months after the Center for Responsible Lending issued its 
predictions, the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) reported that there were more than two 
million homeowners seriously delinquent on their loans. Id. Additionally, the delinquency rate 
for all outstanding mortgages was 9.64 percent, which is the highest rate of delinquent 
mortgages ever recorded since the MBA began recording data in 1972. Id. 
 14. See Joseph Schilling, Code Enforcement and Community Stabilization: The Forgotten 
First Responders to Vacant and Foreclosed Homes, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 101, 109 (2009) 
(“The longer it takes to get through foreclosure, the greater chance that homes will be vacant 
longer, and the longer they are vacant the greater opportunity for them to be vandalized, thus 
making it more costly for the rehabilitation and repairs necessary for eventual resale and 
occupancy.”). See also Kabir Bhatia, As Number of Foreclosed Homes Grows, So Does Mold, 
NPR (July 13, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/2011/07/13/137629788/as-number-of-
foreclosed-homes-grows-so-does-mold (discussing how vacant homes do not have air 
conditioning on in the summer or heat running during the winter, which creates mold and 
mildew problems in the properties). 
 15. See Alby Gallun & Micah Maidenberg, Will the Foreclosure Crisis Kill Chicago?, 
CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20131109/ 
ISSUE01/311099980/recklessabandon?utm_source=ISSUE01&utm_medium=rss&utm_campai
gn=chicagobusiness# (explaining that most neighborhood blocks often prefer empty lots to 
vacant homes because the latter are often stripped bare of piping, become structurally unsound, 
serve as havens for drug and gang activity, and lower the overall property values of the 
surrounding neighborhoods). See also ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO 
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Since abandoned homes lack any form of owner supervision, they 
provide havens for criminal activity and increase crime rates on the 
blocks they inhabit.
16
 As a result, areas with several vacant properties 
within close proximity to each other are especially susceptible to 
increased crime rates.
17
 In addition, the vacant homes themselves are 
common victims of property crime because the lack of any security 
or oversight renders them vulnerable targets.
18
 Thus, they often fall 
prey to scrappers, vandals, and squatters that harm the property’s 
overall appearance and value.
19
 The damage inflicted by such 
interlopers also increases the risk of negligent fires.
20
  
 
AND THE ENDURING NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT 391 (2013). Robert J. Sampson discusses how 
visible cues within a neighborhood illustrate its community input and institutional connections, 
which are essential for its stability. As an example, he examines the Chatham neighborhood on 
Chicago’s South Side, a stable middle class black community that has endured for decades 
despite close proximity to areas with high crime rates and extreme poverty. Id. at 393. Sampson 
notes that the Chatham neighborhood has visibly “neat brick homes,” maintained gardens, 
strong presence of adults and children peacefully residing outside their homes, and signs 
displayed throughout the community warning against “loud music” and “walking a dog without 
a leash.” Id. This atmosphere illustrates the community’s stability and “warn[s] off those that 
would dare tread on the willed tranquility.” Id. Sampson notes, however, that vacant homes 
were beginning to appear on blocks within the neighborhood from the foreclosure crisis, 
presenting a new challenge to the neighborhood’s infrastructure. Id. at 393–94.  
 16. See Schilling, supra note 14, at 110 (“There is a direct correlation between crime and 
vacant and/or abandoned properties which results in the deterioration of housing stock and 
neighborhoods by spurring disinvestment. In Austin, Texas, blocks with vacant buildings had 
3.2 times as many drug calls to police, 1.8 times as many theft calls, and twice the number of 
calls for violent behavior as those neighborhoods without vacant properties.”). As an illustrative 
example, within the first ten days of September 2013, the Chicago Police Department 9-1-1 
Call Center logged 359 complaints regarding problems from vacant buildings. Mary Ellen 
Podmolik, Chicago Seeks Tougher Rules on Vacant Buildings, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 12, 2013), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-09-12/business/ct-biz-0912-housing-ordinance-20130912_ 
1_chicago-city-council-vacant-buildings-mortgage-servicers.  
 17. See Davis, supra note 6, at 403. The “Broken Window Theory” supports the idea that 
since deteriorating vacant properties are less likely to be repaired they advertise to their 
surrounding communities that there are no consequences for bad acts in that neighborhood 
because there is no local control over the property. Id. The Broken Window Theory also posits 
that decrepit abandoned homes increase residential fear and weaken confidence within the 
affected neighborhoods, resulting in the vacant structures serving as conduits for vandalism, 
illegal drug activity, and the unlawful possession of property. Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19. See Rosemary Thompson, Sheriff Dart Outlines His Initiatives, CBA REC., June–July 
2009, at 22, 22, available at http://www.chicagobar.org/AM/NavigationMenu/Home/Files/ 
RecordJuneJuly09.pdf. Sheriff Tom Dart of Cook County explained that abandoned buildings 
pose serious problems because they act like “magnets” that attract criminal activity. Id. 
 20. See Schilling, supra note 14, at 110 (explaining that annually, there is more than $73 
million in property damage resulting from fires occurring within more than twelve thousand 
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Substantial deterioration not only reduces the property values of 
abandoned homes, but it also decreases the values of occupied and 
maintained homes nearby.
21
 For example, a recent survey conducted 
in Philadelphia found that homes within 150 feet of vacant houses 
experienced an average net loss of $7,627 in property value.
22
 In 
addition, houses for sale on blocks with abandoned properties sold on 
average for $6,715 less than homes sold on blocks without 
abandoned properties.
23
  
When mortgagors and mortgagees neglect abandoned properties, 
local governments are stuck picking up the tab.
24
 Abandoned homes 
are often caught in a state known as “zombie foreclosure,” in which 
the mortgagor has abandoned the house, but the mortgagee has 
withdrawn from or stalled the foreclosure proceedings.
25
 Once stuck 
in this foreclosure limbo, neither the mortgagor nor the mortgagee 
assumes responsibility for the abandoned property.
26
 As a result, local 
governments are left as the only remaining party accountable for 
preventing the dilapidation and decay of the property.
27
  
Local governments often drain their financial resources by 
responding to problems caused by vacant properties. For example, 
abandoned homes require increased police presence to respond to 
higher crime rates within their surrounding blocks.
28
 They also drain 
 
vacant structures throughout the United States). 
 21. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 6, at 404 (“A recent study by Stephan Whitaker and 
Thomas J. Fitzpatrick, analyzing Cuyahoga County, Ohio, determined that each additional 
vacant home within 500 feet of a sale reduces the sale price of a home by 1.7% in a low-poverty 
area and 2.1% in a medium-poverty area. Moreover, the study found that a recent foreclosure 
within 500 feet decreases the sale price of a home by ‘2.7[%] in medium-poverty tracts and 
4.6[%] in low-poverty tracts.’”). 
 22. NAT’L VACANT PROPS. CAMPAIGN, VACANT PROPERTIES: THE TRUE COSTS TO 
COMMUNITIES 9 (2005), available at http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/documents/true-
costs.pdf. 
 23. Id.  
 24. Davis, supra note 6, at 403–04. 
 25. See Barbara Liston, Zombie Foreclosures: 300,000 ‘Undead’ Properties Stalk Ex-
Owners, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 28, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/ 
Latest-News-Wires/2013/0328/Zombie-foreclosures-300-000-undead-properties-stalk-ex-owners.  
 26. Id.  
 27. Id. (“According to the Reuters special report, municipalities are left to deal with the 
mess when people move out after receiving a notice of a planned foreclosure sale that the bank 
then cancels.”). 
 28. See Schilling, supra note 14, at 111 (discussing a 2008 study of eight Ohio cities 
which found that vacant and abandoned properties cost those local governments over $15 
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fire department resources due to the increased risk of negligent fires 
and building collapses.
29
 Further, while abandoned properties deplete 
public finances, they also lower local government revenue. Vacant 
homes decrease the amount received through property taxes because 
they lower the values of homes within close proximity, while 
simultaneously providing no revenue from their own property taxes 
due to absent owners.
30
 
Many cities, however, do not have the financial resources 
necessary to properly secure all of the abandoned properties within 
their jurisdictions.
31
 As a result, vacant homes decay beyond 
preservation, and local governments often turn to demolition in order 
to prevent further detrimental harm from plaguing the surrounding 
neighborhoods.
32
 
II. GROWTH OF VACANT PROPERTY REGISTRATION ORDINANCES 
AND HOLDING MORTGAGEES ACCOUNTABLE FOR ABANDONED 
PROPERTY 
Recently, local governments across the United States have 
developed vacant property registration ordinances as a new device to 
address the issues caused by abandoned properties.
33
 These 
ordinances enable cities to identify abandoned property and hold 
 
million annually in public services, such as maintaining and securing the premises, requiring 
police and fire responses, and demolishing properties that posed severe community hazards). 
 29. Id. at 110. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See Keith H. Hirokawa & Ira Gonzalez, Regulating Vacant Property, 42 URB. LAW. 
627, 629 (2010) (“Especially in tight economic circumstances, local governments find 
themselves in a Hobson's choice between ignoring the problems associated with property 
vacancy or allocating law enforcement, fire, and other services in disproportionate measures to 
areas surrounding vacant buildings.”). See also Podmolik, supra note 16 (referencing Chicago 
as an example, which has an estimated eighteen thousand vacant buildings and twenty-one total 
building inspectors). See also Conlin, supra note 3 (explaining that although the city of Los 
Angeles passed a strict vacant property registration ordinance, the lack of city inspectors within 
the city’s budget led to low enforcement, which ultimately rendered it ineffective). 
 32. See Kermit J. Lind, Can Public Nuisance Law Protect Your Neighborhood from Big 
Banks?, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 89, 104 (2011) (“Taxpayers in cities like Cleveland, Buffalo, 
Flint, Detroit, St. Louis, Pittsburgh, and Cincinnati spend millions every year demolishing 
unusable housing stock, and so far, the pace of abandonment is running ahead of the pace of 
demolition.”). 
 33. Martin supra note 4, at 9. 
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parties accountable for maintenance and preservation.
34
 While these 
ordinances are an emerging trend in real estate law, they are deeply 
rooted in the historical police power that allows cities to enact laws 
promoting public safety and welfare.
35
  
Vacant property registration ordinances require either mortgagors 
or mortgagees to register abandoned homes with local governments 
shortly after they are abandoned along with a registration fee.
36
 
Further, these ordinances require the registering party to post contact 
information on the actual vacant home that lists a twenty-four-hour 
maintenance crew responsible for the premises.
37
 The property is also 
usually required to have liability insurance.
38
 Once it is registered, the 
abandoned property must conform to the ordinance’s maintenance 
standards.
39
 Failure to comply with the standards subjects the 
registering party to fines and penalties.
40
  
While vacant property registration ordinances vary across the 
country, there are two main models that determine which party, the 
mortgagor or the mortgagee, is responsible for registering and 
maintaining the property: the “Classic Model” and the “Chula Vista 
Model.”41 
 
 34. Id.  
 35. See, e.g., Goldstein v. City of Wilmington, No. 84C-JL-36, 1986 WL 6586, at *1 (Del. 
Super. Ct. June 3, 1986) (“A necessary concomitant . . . is the authority vested in a municipality 
to declare, prevent, and abate a public nuisance, which is broadly defined as any behavior that 
unreasonably interferes with health, safety, peace, comfort or convenience of the general 
community.”). See also Evenson v. City of St. Paul Bd. of Appeals, 467 N.W.2d 363, 365 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding the constitutional challenge against the city’s vacant property 
registry ordinance by stating that “statutes are presumed to be constitutional . . . [t]he city 
merely refused to allow [the appellee] to continue an un reasonable [sic] use by denying 
appellant's request for an indefinite waiver of the vacant building fee. The fee is not 
unreasonable or confiscatory”). See also Vill. of Brady v. Melcher, 502 N.W.2d 458, 462 (Neb. 
1993) (“This court has long held that municipalities may, in the exercise of a valid police 
power, protect the public health through ordinances that operate within legislative limits.”). 
 36. See C. Tyler Mulligan, Toward a Comprehensive Program for Regulating Vacant or 
Abandoned Dwellings in North Carolina: The General Police Power, Minimum Housing 
Standards, and Vacant Property Registration, 32 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1, 40, 43–45 (2009). 
 37. Id. at 40. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 43–44. 
 41. See Davis, supra note 6, at 406 (“[Vacant property registration] ordinances generally 
implement one of two types of registration models, or a combination of the two. These 
registration models are the classic model and the [Chula Vista] model. The classic model 
requires registration based on length of vacancy. The [Chula Vista] model requires registration 
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The Classic Model requires the mortgagor to register the 
abandoned home and pay a registration fee that correlates to the 
length of time that the property was vacant.
42
 The Classic Model was 
first developed in Wilmington, Delaware and was designed to create 
incentives for mortgagors to prevent their abandoned homes from 
substantially decaying, as well as pursue efficient uses for their 
properties.
43
  
The Chula Vista Model has similar motives, but differs in its 
approach to owner liability. Rather than holding the individual 
homeowner responsible, the Chula Vista Model holds the mortgagee 
responsible for registering and maintaining the property once it has 
initiated foreclosure proceedings.
44
 The city of Chula Vista, 
California developed this vacant property registration ordinance 
model, and it proved immensely successful shortly after its 
enactment.
45
 Because the Chula Vista Model achieved such success, 
 
initiated at foreclosure. While most, if not all [vacant property registration] ordinances utilize 
one of the two models, there is a large amount of flexibility over the implementation within 
each model.”).  
 42. See Schilling, supra note 14, at 135–37. 
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. at 142–43. Schilling provides a detailed description of how Chula Vista’s vacant 
property registration ordinance operates: 
Chula Vista's program requires mortgage lenders to inspect defaulted properties to 
confirm whether they are occupied or abandoned. If a given property is found to be 
vacant, the program requires that the lender exercise the abandonment clause in their 
mortgage contract and register the property with the City, after paying a $70 
registration fee. The lender must further secure and maintain the property to comport 
with neighborhood standards, which typically requires that landscaped areas be 
maintained. Mortgage companies are also required to “hire a local company to inspect 
the property on a weekly basis.” On the property must be posted the name and twenty-
four-hour contact number of this company. As the city's description of the program 
states, “[i]t is hoped that the combination of observant neighbors and an accessible 
local responsible party will deter . . . potential deterioration of the property” and 
maintain existing property values.  
Id. at 142–43. See also Alexander & Powell, supra note 11, at 7–8 (explaining that local 
governments that pass vacant property registration ordinances that hold mortgagees liable for 
maintaining the premises are able to do so under a theory “that the mortgagee has the 
contractual, if not statutory, right to manage and control the property once there has been a 
default”). 
 45. See Martin, supra note 4, at 20–21 (describing that once the city began imposing fines 
on mortgage lenders and servicers, the city began bringing in enough revenue from compliance 
with the vacant property registration ordinance that after eight months the program had “nearly 
paid for itself”). 
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it is becoming a common form of vacant property registration 
ordinance in the country.
46
 
There are many benefits to enacting the Chula Vista Model. First, 
holding mortgagees responsible for registering and maintaining 
abandoned property places the liability of home preservation on the 
party that has more financial resources to preserve the abandoned 
property.
47
 Second, the revenue generated from the registration fees 
and fines compensates cities for the financial resources spent trying 
to maintain abandoned properties within their jurisdictions.
48
 Finally, 
requiring mortgagees to pay registration fees and face potential fines 
for failing to maintain vacant homes creates incentives for large 
institutions in the mortgage industry to actively prevent owners from 
abandoning their homes.
49
  
The mortgage industry, however, often opposes local government 
efforts to shift liability onto mortgagees for preserving and 
maintaining abandoned property.
50
 Since many of the major 
 
 46. Id. at 21. 
 47. For a detailed examination of the benefits of formulating vacant property registration 
ordinances that hold the mortgagee accountable for registering abandoned properties, see 
Kristin M. Pinkston, In the Weeds: Homeowners Falling Behind on Their Mortgages, Lenders 
Playing the Foreclosure Game, and Cities Left Paying the Price, 34 S. ILL. U. L.J. 621, 641–42 
(2010). Pinkston explains that mortgagees know when the property has been vacated, whether 
the owner is fighting foreclosure, and any other specific concerns about that property. Id. at 
641. Therefore, having mortgagees register the property notifies the city that the home has been 
vacated; otherwise, local governments may not be aware until the property has deteriorated to 
the point that motivates neighbors to register complaints with the city. Id. Furthermore, 
requiring mortgagees to register the property puts the world on notice as to who holds the 
mortgage on that property. Id. at 642. Oftentimes, the homeowners depart after the foreclosure 
proceedings have initiated due to their complete financial inability to handle the property. As an 
illustrative example, Reuters issued an article examining a fifty-eight-year-old former social 
worker who fell behind on his mortgage payments. See, e.g., Conlin, supra note 3. Once the 
former social worker fell behind, the mortgagee foreclosed on his property, forcing him and his 
wife to move out. Id. However, because the mortgagee never finished the foreclosure 
proceedings and the property was abandoned, the former social worker found himself liable for 
city fines for waste removal, sewer fees, and back taxes adding to his already outstanding 
mortgage loan. Id. 
 48. See BUS. & PROF’L PEOPLE FOR THE PUB. INTEREST ET AL., supra note 6, at 7 
(“Effective registry programs also require registrants to pay a fee at regular intervals, which 
defrays the additional costs of providing municipal services associated with such properties. 
Fees also create a strong financial incentive for owners to secure and maintain vacant property 
and return it to productive use.”). 
 49. Id. 
 50. See Lind, supra note 32, at 101–02. Oftentimes, servicers for large corporations or 
entities that own thousands of mortgages have a contractual obligation prohibiting them from 
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institutions in the mortgage industry own pools of mortgages and 
operate on a national scale, they have little incentive to prevent 
community decay, nor are they concerned with local neighborhood 
blight.
51
 Additionally, the mortgage industry has taken precautions to 
protect itself from liability regarding foreclosed and abandoned 
properties.
52
 For example, the Mortgage Bankers Association, the 
national association that represents the entire real estate finance 
industry,
53
 has lobbied to decrease the maintenance and security 
requirements in local government vacant property registration 
ordinances.
54
  
The mortgage industry prefers state or federal regulations over 
local government ordinances because it can lobby and affect large 
scale legislation, thereby minimizing the impact of the property 
 
spending “non-recoverable” finances on maintaining vacant property in a declining housing 
market. Id. As a result, servicers often refuse to spend resources and avoid completing 
foreclosure proceedings to avoid taking title, in order to minimize the economic losses for the 
corporations that own the mortgages. Id.  
 51. See Pinkston, supra note 47, at 635–36. Pinkston states that “[t]he financial 
institutions creating and securing these mortgages are motivated first and foremost by profit 
margins. Perhaps in the area of foreclosure, the drive for producing profits outweighs any 
consideration of neighborhood stability or revitalization.” To strengthen her argument, Pinkston 
examined how large lender-mortgagees that conduct business on a national level have no strong 
ties to municipalities or local communities, which led to a disproportionate use of sub-prime 
mortgages in lower-income and minority neighborhoods in highly distressed urban areas. Id. at 
635–36. Since larger institutions have no investment in a particular community’s stability, they 
gave sub-prime loans that contributed to the foreclosure crisis and have ignored notices to 
appear in court to defend those properties from municipal code violations. Id. 
 52. See Mike McIntire, Tracking Loans Through a Firm that Holds Millions, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 23, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/24/business/24mers.html?pagewanted=all&_ r=0. To secure 
anonymity of the mortgagee’s identity throughout foreclosure proceedings, the largest 
corporations in the mortgage industry, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, designed the 
Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS). Id. MERS is a confidential computer 
registry for tracking mortgage loans. Id. It often initiates foreclosure proceedings on behalf of 
the mortgagee without identifying its identity, thereby acting as a “corporate cloak” to shield 
over three thousand registered mortgagees from the distressed communities and judicial 
foreclosure proceedings resulting from their properties. Id. 
 53. MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS’N, http://www.mbaa.org/AboutMBA (last visited Jan. 5, 
2015). 
 54. In 2008, Chicago proposed a vacant housing registration ordinance that required 
mortgagees to provide steel panels and reinstall windows and doors on abandoned structures (as 
opposed to using standard plywood boards). See Schilling, supra note 14, at 145–47. It also 
required mortgagees to maintain the lighting within the properties and hire private security 
firms to monitor the premises. Id. at 146. The mortgage industry applied a “full court press” to 
successfully defeat the strict measures proposed by the city council. Id. 
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regulations.
55
 In fact, in the wake of growing vacant property 
registration ordinances, the mortgage industry has offered its own 
alternative system of recording vacant property and has promoted it 
to local governments,
56
 which presents another issue in and of itself.
57
 
III. THE RECENT THREAT OF FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC 
EXEMPTION FROM VACANT PROPERTY REGISTRATION ORDINANCES 
As cities throughout the nation have enacted vacant property 
registration ordinances, successful ordinances are often those that 
maintain local government control and permit few exceptions.
58
 
Exempting large amounts of property decreases cities’ regulatory 
authority, which thereby inhibits the effectiveness of vacant property 
registration ordinances in combating urban blight. 
Recently, in Federal Housing Financing Agency v. City of 
Chicago,
59
 the Federal District Court of Northern Illinois considered 
whether Chicago could enforce its vacant property registration 
ordinance against properties where either Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac 
was the mortgagee.
60
 Chicago’s ordinance, a combination of the 
Classic and Chula Vista models,
61
 requires the mortgagee to register 
 
 55. See Davis, supra note 6, at 421 (“Due to the greater influence of the mortgage 
industry at the state legislative level, the banking industry can have a larger role in crafting the 
[vacant property registration ordinance]. This could potentially lead to legislation that favors the 
mortgage industry as opposed to accomplishing the goals of [vacant property registration] 
ordinances.”). Furthermore, the relative autonomy local governments have from lobbyists 
makes them better situated than state governments to draft vacant property registration 
ordinances that effectively address their local needs without succumbing to outside pressures. 
Id. 
 56. Martin, supra note 4, at 23. 
 57. Id. at 35–36. There is potential for abuse due to MERS’s reputation for protecting 
mortgagees by hiding their identities throughout foreclosure proceedings. Id. Furthermore, the 
MERS registration system lacks any governmental regulation, which allows room for 
misconduct. Id. at 36. 
 58. See Davis, supra note 6, at 416. Davis examined how one local government drafted a 
vacant property registration ordinance so that it did not apply when mortgagees registered the 
property through MERS. Id. Due to the significant amount of mortgages registered through 
MERS, this approach presented too broad of an exception for the ordinance to have a successful 
impact on preventing or maintaining abandoned property. Id. As a result, the statute was 
“rendered virtually useless.” Id. 
 59. 962 F. Supp. 2d 1044 (N.D. Ill. 2013). 
 60. Id. at 1047–48. 
 61. Chicago Municipal Code states that the “owner” of the property is responsible for 
registering it with the city: 
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an abandoned property and maintain the premises after it is vacated.
62
 
While the ordinance is similar to others, this case presented a new 
issue regarding whether the courts will enforce local government 
vacant property registration ordinances against Fannie Mae or 
Freddie Mac.
63
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are major entities in the 
mortgage industry, as they collectively own or guarantee half of all 
mortgages in the United States.
64
 The Federal Housing Finance 
Authority (FHFA), however, has had a conservatorship over both 
entities since 2008.
65
 The FHFA brought suit against the city of 
 
The owner of any building that has become vacant shall within 30 days after the 
building becomes vacant or within 30 days after assuming ownership of the building, 
whichever is later, file a registration statement for each such building with the 
department of buildings on forms provided by that department for such purposes. 
CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 13-12-125(a)(1) (2013). This is similar to the Classic Model 
because it holds the owner/mortgagor liable for registering the property. However, under § 13-
12-126(a)(1), if the owner/mortgagor has not registered the vacant property after 30 days, then 
liability shifts onto the mortgagee to register: 
The mortgagee of any residential building that has become vacant and which is not 
registered pursuant to this section or Section 13-12-125(a) of this Code shall, within 
the later of 30 days after the building becomes vacant and unregistered or 60 days after 
a default, file a registration statement with the department of buildings on forms 
provided by that department for such purposes and pay a registration fee of $500.00. 
CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 13-12-126(a)(1) (2011). 
 62. CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 13-12-126(b) (2011). The ordinance lists the standards 
required to properly maintain abandoned property, such as securing the building’s doors and 
windows, maintaining the grass on the premises, shoveling snow off the sidewalk, abating any 
accumulation of trash or debris outside the premises, reasonably maintaining the physical 
integrity of the building, keeping the property free of vermin and rodents, and posting signs that 
signify the structure is vacant, as well as providing contact information in case issues arise 
regarding the property. Id. 
 63. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 1056. Although the government created 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as Government Sponsored Enterprises, prior to 2008, they were 
both run as for-profit corporations owned by private shareholders. See FED. HOUS. FIN. 
AGENCY, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE HOUSING GOVERNMENT-
SPONSORED ENTERPRISES 2–4 (2011), available at http://fhfaoig.gov/Content/Files/History% 
20of%20the%20Government%20Sponsored%20Enterprises.pdf. In 2008, Congress established 
the Federal Housing Finance Agency and granted it a conservatorship over Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac. Id. at 6. 
 64. Mortgage Giant Freddie Mac Posts $4.2B Profit in 2Q; Paying $3.9B Dividend to 
Government, STAR TRIB. (Aug. 4, 2015, 10:30 AM), http://www.startribune.com/freddie-mac-
posts-4-2b-profit-in-2q-paying-3-9b-dividend/320598992/. In Chicago alone, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac own over 258,000 mortgages. See Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 
1049. 
 65. See FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 63, at 6. See 
also Zachary A. Goldfarb et al., Treasury to Rescue Fannie and Freddie, WASH. POST (Sept. 7, 
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Chicago seeking both a declaratory exemption from the ordinance 
and an injunction halting its enforcement against properties where 
either Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac was the mortgagee.
66
 Chicago 
responded by filing a motion to dismiss the complaint.
67
 
The court rejected Chicago’s motion and ruled in favor of the 
FHFA.
68
 After dismissing Chicago’s procedural arguments, the 
court’s main analysis relied upon determining Congressional intent 
regarding the extent of FHFA’s authority over Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac homes under the Housing and Economic Recovery Act 
of 2008 (HERA).
69
 Specifically, the court was concerned with 
whether the HERA preempted local governments from regulating 
abandoned property owned by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.
70
 The 
pertinent provision the Court addressed reads: “When acting as 
conservator or receiver, the [FHFA] shall not be subject to the 
direction or supervision of any other agency of the United States or 
 
2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/06/AR2008090602540. 
html?hpid=topnews (describing the Bush Administration’s decision to takeover Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac due to the financial collapse of 2008). 
 66.  The FHFA argued that it was exempt from Chicago’s vacant property registration 
ordinance, and thus it should receive an injunction against the ordinance’s enforcement 
regarding properties where either Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac was the mortgagee. Fed. Hous. 
Fin. Agency, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 1050. The FHFA supported its claim by arguing that the 
Housing and Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) preempted local governments from regulating 
properties where either Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac owned the mortgage. Id. at 1056. 
Furthermore, it alleged that the registration fees, as well as the fines imposed for failure to 
properly maintain abandoned structures, were an impermissible tax on the federal government 
when imposed against Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac properties. Id. at 1062. 
 67. Chicago presented procedural objections against the FHFA’s standing to bring suit 
against the ordinance, as well as the ripeness of the issue. Id. at 1050. Chicago’s substantive 
argument to dismiss the FHFA’s request for summary judgment, however, was that the HERA 
did not expressly preempt local governments from enforcing vacant property registration 
ordinances against FHFA properties because Congress did not include local governments as 
entities that could not direct the FHFA’s actions. Id. Further, the city argued against implied 
preemption because “there is a presumption against finding preemption in cases involving the 
traditional exercise of police powers by local government entities.” Id. at 1058. Finally, 
Chicago argued that the registration fee imposed against the FHFA for registering its vacant 
properties was a permissible local government “fee,” not a “tax,” on the federal government. Id. 
at 1062. 
 68. Id. at 1064. 
 69. Id. at 1056–63. 
 70. Id. at 1056–61. 
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any State in the exercise of the rights, powers, and privileges of the 
[FHFA].”71  
Relying on this provision, the court acknowledged that the HERA 
expressly preempts federal agencies and state governments but is 
silent regarding local government vacant property registration 
ordinances.
72
 Nevertheless, the court applied both “field preemption” 
and “conflict preemption” analyses to find that there was “implied 
preemption” within the provision that prevented cities from enforcing 
vacant property registration ordinances against the FHFA.
73
 Under 
the field preemption analysis, the court found that because the 
language of the HERA gave the FHFA exclusive control over Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac’s assets, Congress must have also intended the 
FHFA to have exclusive control over how to manage homes owned 
by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, rather than subject them to 
municipal oversight.
74
 The court applied a similar conflict preemption 
analysis, finding that since Congress must have intended the FHFA to 
have exclusive control over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s assets, 
Chicago’s ordinance conflicted with HERA by enabling the city to 
manage the abandoned properties.
75
 
Furthermore, the court held that the ordinance’s registration fees 
and possible fines for failing to properly maintain abandoned 
properties were impermissible taxes on the federal government, as 
opposed to permissible regulatory fees.
76
 The court cited the Seventh 
Circuit’s standard for distinguishing permissible fees from 
impermissible taxes against the federal government, which focuses 
on “whether it provides a general benefit to the public, of a sort often 
financed by a general tax, or whether it provides more narrow 
benefits to regulated companies or defrays the agency's cost of 
regulation.”77 Chicago argued that the registration fee was 
 
 71. 12 U.S.C. § 4617(a)(7) (2012). 
 72. The court further noted that not only are cities not included in the statute’s language, 
but the statute’s definition of a “State” also did not include local governments or cities. Fed. 
Hous. Fin. Agency, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 1056. 
 73. Id. at 1057–61. 
 74. Id. at 1059–60. 
 75. Id. at 1061. 
 76. Id. at 1062.  
 77. Id. (quoting Hager v. City of W. Peoria, 84 F.3d 865, 870 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
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permissible because it was narrowly connected to the costs of 
monitoring and inspecting vacant buildings, as well as discouraging 
the growth of more abandoned properties and offsetting the city’s 
expenditures from maintaining the damages caused from vacant 
buildings.
78
 The court, however, rejected the argument and held that 
the registration fee was a tax because the revenue from the fee did not 
pay for a service that Chicago rendered to the FHFA and because 
monitoring vacant buildings benefitted the entire city’s residents in 
general.
79
  
Therefore, the court held that abandoned houses owned by Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac were not subject to Chicago’s vacant property 
registration ordinance.
80
 
This case is not the first instance where a court has relied on 
implied preemption to exempt a federal agency in the mortgage 
industry. For example, in United States v. Stadium Apartments, Inc.
81
 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that properties owned by the 
federal government were preempted from local property ordinances 
because the federal government was “not in the real estate 
business.”82 
 
 78. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 1062. 
 79. Id. at 1063. The court also found that the FHFA did not cause the buildings to become 
vacant and that “vacant properties are not a necessary aspect of the FHFA’s participation in the 
mortgage market.” Id. 
 80. The Court found that the HERA granted the FHFA exclusive control over Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac to protect the agency’s assets. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 
1058. Since Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s assets included mortgages on abandoned properties, 
the court expanded this protection to conclude that the FHFA must also have exclusive control 
to determine how to maintain and secure those abandoned properties. Id. at 1060. Therefore, the 
court rejected Chicago’s argument that the HERA only granted exclusive authority regarding 
mortgage lending, while Chicago’s ordinance was focused on regulating abandoned buildings 
in its neighborhoods. Id. Finally, the court found that since the HERA expressly prohibited 
states or other federal agencies from regulating the FHFA, Congress must have also intended to 
include cities, “[otherwise] [s]uch a result would invite chaos, as FHFA would be subject to a 
variety of potentially conflicting ordinances, raising the expenses of FHFA in not only 
complying with those ordinances, but in simply monitoring the various requirements.” Id. 
 81. 425 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1970).  
 82. Id. at 366–67. Although the Ninth Circuit was faced with the issue of whether 
properties owned by the federal government were subjected to a state’s statutory redemption 
laws, as opposed to vacant property registration ordinances, the case still involved the same 
issue of whether the federal government should be preempted from local property laws when it 
acts as a property owner. 
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Further, to determine whether a registration fee constitutes a tax or 
regulatory fee, courts generally examine the local government’s 
purpose for the generated revenue and whether it was intended to 
provide a general benefit as a tax, or compensate cities for the 
specific services rendered.
83
 For example, in Easthampton Savings 
Bank v. City of Springfield,
84
 the United States District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts examined whether Springfield’s vacant 
property registration ordinance imposed a tax or regulatory fee by 
requiring mortgagees to pay a $10,000 cash bond when registering 
vacant property.
85
 The court held that it was a regulatory fee because 
the money was intended to reinsure compliance with the ordinance 
and compensate the city for the costs spent regulating foreclosed 
property.
86
  
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT’S HOLDING AND PROPOSAL FOR WHY 
FUTURE COURTS SHOULD REFUSE TO EXEMPT FANNIE MAE AND 
FREDDIE MAC 
The Federal District Court of Northern Illinois erroneously 
determined that Congress intended to preempt the FHFA from local 
vacant property registration ordinances. The court erred because it 
focused its analysis on the burdens that Chicago’s ordinance imposed 
on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, rather than on Chicago’s local 
concerns with regards to maintaining abandoned property. Further, 
the court mistakenly inferred preemption from statutory silence and 
 
 83. See, e.g., Fed. Hous. Fin., 962 F. Supp. 2d at 1062 (The Seventh Circuit distinguishes 
impermissible taxes from permissible fees by examining the ultimate use of the revenue, 
“whether it provides a general benefit to the public, of a sort often financed by a general tax, or 
whether it provides more narrow benefits to regulated companies or defrays the agency’s cost 
of regulation”); see also Easthampton Sav. Bank v. City of Springfield, 874 F. Supp. 2d 25, 33 
(D. Mass. 2012) (noting Massachusetts standard similarly examines who benefits from the 
revenue generated from the registration fee, as well as whether the intent is “to raise revenues 
[or] to compensate the governmental entity providing the services for its expenses”). 
 84. 874 F. Supp. 2d 25, 28 (D. Mass. 2012). 
 85. Id. at 33. 
 86. Id. at 33–34 (“The City's retention of a portion of the bond under the Foreclosure 
Ordinance is directly tied to defraying its costs of regulating foreclosures in the City . . . 
Because the portion of the bond that the City retains is ‘reasonably designed to compensate the 
[City] for its anticipated regulation-related expenses,’ the charge constitutes a regulatory fee, 
not a tax.”).  
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unjustifiably treated Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac differently than 
private corporations in the mortgage industry. 
The court should not have favored Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s 
interests in avoiding compliance with Chicago’s vacant property 
registration ordinance because abandoned property is a local 
problem. The court’s determining factor for finding implied 
preemption was not express Congressional intent, but rather its own 
concern that subjecting Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to various 
cities’ ordinances would be burdensome and expensive.87 By 
focusing its analysis on the ordinance’s impact on Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, the court ignored the hazards that abandoned properties 
inflict upon Chicago through increased crime, greater urban blight, 
and complete dilapidation of communities.
88
 Because abandoned 
properties pose hazards to their surrounding neighborhoods, 
Chicago’s concerns in maintaining vacant homes in its jurisdiction 
should have trumped the court’s concerns regarding the burdens and 
costs the ordinance imposed on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
Further, both entities are major national corporations, and therefore 
are not as closely impacted by abandoned properties’ hazards as are 
local governments.  
The court also erred in finding that Congress intended to preempt 
the FHFA from local government regulation. The HERA only 
explicitly preempts states and other federal agencies.
89
 This does not 
necessarily prove that Congress intended to preempt local 
government property regulations as well. In fact, Congress may have 
intentionally omitted local governments from the statutory language 
for that purpose.
90
 Furthermore, it is worth noting that other federal 
courts have found that properties owned by the federal government 
are still subject to local governments’ property ordinances.91  
 
 87. “In enacting HERA, Congress could not have intended . . . [to] permit thousands of 
municipalities all over the country to impose varying ordinances and obligations on FHFA. 
Such a result would invite chaos, as FHFA would be subject to a variety of potentially 
conflicting ordinances, raising the expenses of FHFA in not only complying with those 
ordinances, but in simply monitoring the various requirements.” Id. at 1060. 
 88. In fact, the court’s only mention of the detrimental impact that abandoned property 
inflicts upon Chicago is in a brief footnote. Id. at 1062 n.22. 
 89. Id. at 1056. 
 90. See generally 12 U.S.C. § 4617(a)(7) (2012). 
 91. As an example, the Seventh Circuit in Burroughs v. Hills determined whether 
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Finally, the court should not have treated Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac differently than private mortgagees that have to adhere to vacant 
property registration ordinances. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are 
some of the largest entities in the mortgage industry.
92
 Thus, they 
share the same responsibility for the recent the growth of abandoned 
properties as other private companies within the mortgage industry. 
By finding implied preemption, the court exempted Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac because of their affiliation with the federal government 
through the FHFA’s conservatorship. However, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac’s affiliation with the federal government does not 
warrant special exemption, and thus the courts should not continue 
preempting agencies from local regulations merely because of their 
affiliation with the federal government. 
The court also erroneously determined that the registration fees 
required under Chicago’s vacant property registration ordinance 
constituted an impermissible “tax,” as opposed to a permissible 
“regulatory fee.”93 Other courts have examined this issue regarding 
the registration fees for vacant property registration ordinances, and 
have come to different conclusions.
94
 Here, Chicago’s vacant 
 
properties owned by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
were subject to city ordinances regarding maintaining and securing premises. Burroughs v. 
Hills, 741 F.2d 1525, 1528 (7th Cir. 1984). The court noted that federal law requires HUD 
property management to conform with local law requirements. Id. While this case involved 
HUD properties, as opposed to properties where Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac were the 
mortgagee, and the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that there are exceptions, this case 
demonstrates that simply because a property is owned by the federal government does not in 
and of itself mean that it is preempted from local property ordinances and regulations. 
 92. On August 8, 2013, Fannie Mae reported a $10.1 billion profit from the second 
quarter, which was the sixth straight profitable period for the company, and Freddie Mac posted 
its second largest quarterly profit ever during that same period. See Margaret Chadbourn, 
Fannie, Freddie Should Recognize Bad Loan Costs Immediately: Watchdog, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 
19, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-08-19/business/sns-rt-us-usa-fanniefreddie-
watchdog-20130819_1_fhfa-federal-housing-finance-agency-fannie-mae. 
 93. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. City of Chi., 962 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1063 (N.D. Ill. 2013). 
 94. For example, the Supreme Court of Washington also examined whether the 
registration fee within Seattle’s vacant property registration ordinance constituted a regulatory 
fee or an improper tax. Margola Assocs. v. City of Seattle, 854 P.2d 23, 28–31 (Wash. 1993). 
The mortgage industry argued that the ordinance was a tax. It stated that because the ordinance 
was silent on the purpose of the registration fee, it was primarily intended to raise money as 
opposed to regulate. Id. at 31–32. Although the court rejected this argument and found that the 
ordinance’s silence on the purpose of the registration fee did not render it a tax, it remanded the 
case on the issue of whether the revenue generated from the registration fee “greatly exceed[ed] 
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property registration ordinance imposes a registration fee (and 
possible fines), which the city claims compensates for expenses the 
city incurs through securing and maintaining abandoned property.
95
 
Furthermore, the registration fee does not create general revenue for 
the city because the only guaranteed funds from the ordinance are a 
base registration fee of $500.
96
 A mere $500 per vacant home cannot 
generate revenue because maintaining each abandoned property costs 
Chicago thousands in public funds.
97
 Additionally, because Chicago’s 
ordinance does not require registration renewal fees,
98
 mortgagees do 
not have to pay anything further unless the vacant property violates 
the maintenance or security standards.
99
 This indicates that the fines 
imposed are primarily designed to ensure compliance with the 
ordinance’s requirements, as opposed to raising revenue for the city. 
Therefore, the ordinance’s registration fee constitutes a permissible 
regulatory fee, rather than an impermissible tax. 
Future courts faced with FHFA challenges to local vacant 
property registration ordinances should not adopt the holding from 
Federal Housing Financing Agency v. City of Chicago because of its 
ramifications. If courts adopt this ruling, they will essentially nullify 
all vacant property registration ordinances within their jurisdictions. 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac own a vast majority of mortgages 
 
the proper regulatory costs associated with those ordinances,” to determine whether the 
registration fee was a regulatory fee or improper tax. Id.  
 95. See Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 23, 
Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. City of Chicago, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1044 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (No. 11 C 
08795) (“It is evident from looking at the Ordinance as a whole that the one-time $500 fee, 
charged to mortgagees, is connected to the City's cost of monitoring vacant properties and the 
follow-up inspections for compliance. Moreover, mortgagees have it in their power to avoid the 
fee entirely in a number of ways: for instance, by working with the owner to keep the building 
occupied, to keep it in good repair, or to attempt to rent or sell it.”). See also Alexander & 
Powell, supra note 11, at 8 (noting that registration costs and penalties from vacant property 
registration ordinances are not taxes, but rather constitute regulatory fees reflective of the costs 
imposed on local governments as a result of increased fire, police, and building inspection 
duties that accompany foreclosed residential properties). 
 96. CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 13-12-126(a)(1) (2013). 
 97. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 98. CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 13-12-126(a)(1) (2013). 
 99. CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 13-12-126(c) (2013) (“Any person who violates any 
provision of this section or of the rules and regulations issued hereunder shall be fined not less 
than $500.00 and not more than $1,000.00 for each offense.”). 
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throughout the nation.
100
 Allowing them to escape liability effectively 
renders all vacant property registration ordinances moot because too 
many homes would be beyond cities’ jurisdictions.101 Such a large 
exception harms every local government’s ability to use vacant 
property registration ordinances as an effective tool to control and 
maintain the hazards caused by abandoned houses.
102
 
While the court in Federal Housing Finance Authority v. City of 
Chicago was concerned with the burdens resulting from subjecting 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to various cities’ ordinance 
requirements, there are viable alternatives available. For example, 
large institutions that own thousands of mortgages, such as Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, can hire local servicer companies that ensure 
that properties conform to particular cities’ vacant property 
registration ordinances.
103
 This solution would relieve both entities 
from the burdens resulting from having to constantly research and 
adhere to various local government ordinance requirements.  
Although this option imposes financial costs on Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, the alternative is for local governments to continue 
using taxpayer funds to maintain, preserve, and demolish abandoned 
property.
104
 Because Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are national 
institutions and local governments have more limited resources, 
future courts should favor cities’ concerns and require Fannie Mae 
 
 100. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are two of the largest financial institutions in the world 
and own about $5 trillion in combined mortgage assets throughout the nation. JOHN GRIFFITH, 
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, 7 THINGS YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE 
MAC 1 (2012), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/ 
GriffithFannieFreddieBrief.pdf. 
 101. See supra text accompanying note 58. 
 102. See Benton C. Martin, Federalism and Municipal Innovation: Lessons from the Fight 
Against Vacant Properties, 46 URB. LAW. 361, 372–73 (2014) (discussing how both state 
governments and the federal government have reacted negatively to local government vacant 
property registration ordinances). In this piece, Martin discusses Federal Housing Financing 
Agency v. City of Chicago as a recent example of how federal agencies have attempted to limit 
cities’ abilities to regulate vacant property through vacant property registration ordinances. Id.  
 103. See Martin, supra note 4, at 24. There are servicers in Chicago that register vacant 
properties, install security devices, and ensure that the properties remain compliant with local 
property regulations. Id. Other companies provide similar services, such as registering 
properties, ensuring compliance, and even providing mortgagees who wish to secure the 
property themselves with access to different municipal forms outlining standards for registering 
and maintaining vacant properties in different cities. Id. 
 104. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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and Freddie Mac to bear the financial burden of maintaining 
abandoned property. 
Furthermore, since abandoned property presents detrimental 
hazards to its surrounding community, local concerns should trump 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s financial concerns. Abandoned 
property increases crime rates, lowers property values, and drains 
local government resources. These issues severely impact cities, but 
they do not substantially harm Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.
105
 
Therefore, future courts should prioritize local government concerns 
by enforcing vacant property registration ordinances against both 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
CONCLUSION 
The rise of abandoned properties resulting from the foreclosure 
crisis continues to trouble cities across the nation.
106
 In fact, in 
Chicago, the problem of vacant homes has been described as the 
worst disaster to strike the city since the Great Chicago Fire of 
1871.
107
 Vacant property registration ordinances provide local 
 
 105. See Fannie, Freddie Investors Ramp Up Push for Companies’ Revival, REUTERS (Feb. 
5, 2014, 4:00 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/05/usa-fanniefreddie-shares-idUS 
L2N0LA1L120140205 (explaining that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are now making “record 
profits”). 
 106. See Katheleen Conti, After Brief Decline, Foreclosures Up Again in Greater Boston, 
BOS. GLOBE (July 30, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/regionals/south/2015/07/ 
30/after-brief-decline-foreclosures-are-again-greater-boston/tqzL8nWhT3N8UnaB5aeJvJ/story. 
html (discussing recent rises in foreclosures across Boston and Massachusetts as “aftershocks” 
of the foreclosure crisis); see also Christine DiGangi, States Where Foreclosures Are 
Stubbornly High, USA TODAY (July 19, 2015, 9:32 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/money/personalfinance/2015/07/16/credit-dotcom-foreclosures-states/30196747/ (listing 
states in which foreclosure rates remain high). Recently, Crain’s Chicago Business issued a 
special report entitled “Reckless Abandon,” that covered the crisis of abandoned properties 
throughout Cook County, Illinois. Gallun & Maidenberg, supra note 15. The city of Chicago 
had 33,902 vacant properties by the middle of 2013, which was a 22 percent increase from 
2010. Id. In the Washington Park neighborhood on Chicago’s South Side, the population has 
plummeted 79 percent between 1950 and 2010, which has left more than a third of the 
neighborhood’s homes vacant. Id. Furthermore, this problem was not contained to the city, as 
the suburbs in Cook County had a total of 21,479 vacant homes in 2013, which was a 79 
percent increase from 2010. Id.  
 107. Gallun & Maidenberg, supra note 15 (“‘Basically what we’re seeing are the effects of 
something much larger than the Great Chicago Fire,’ says architect and urban planner Marshall 
Brown, an assistant professor at the Illinois Institute of Technology . . . ‘how do we rebuild in 
this new world in a way that’s smarter, knowing what we know now?’”).  
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governments with the means to preserve abandoned properties within 
their jurisdictions. They hold parties accountable to ensure that 
homes do not decay and damage their surrounding communities. 
These ordinances also reduce the public resources currently spent 
attempting to maintain the negative effects vacant properties impose 
on their communities. 
Exempting all Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac properties disrupts 
the effectiveness of these ordinances. Further, it unfairly prioritizes 
the financial interests of major federal mortgage institutions over the 
sustainability of the cities substantially harmed by the problems 
inflicted by the plight of abandoned properties. Vacant property 
registration ordinances cannot succeed as an effective tool for 
maintaining abandoned homes if the largest mortgage institutions in 
the country are exempt because of their affiliation with the federal 
government. Therefore, future courts should not rely on the precedent 
set in Federal Housing Financing Agency v. City of Chicago.
108
 
 
 108. It is worth noting that rather than appeal the ruling, the City of Chicago and the FHFA 
settled the matter outside of court. See Mary Ellen Podmolik, FHFA, Chicago Settle Vacant 
Property Dispute, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 7, 2014), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-04-07/ 
business/chi-fhfa-vacant-buildings-dispute-20140407_1_fhfa-vacant-building-ordinance-fannie-
mae. Under the terms of the settlement, the FHFA will voluntarily register vacant properties 
owned by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with the city, but it will not pay a registration fee or 
endure fines for failing to register. Id. In addition, the FHFA will not seek to recover fines and 
fees that the federal agency had already paid to Chicago prior to the lawsuit. Id. Finally, the 
FHFA agreed to work with Chicago to find solutions to some of the problems plaguing the city 
due to abandoned properties, as well as boost neighborhood recovery in these areas. Id.  
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